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PETER COLLETT
Standard Setting and Economic Consequences: an Ethical Issue
The Australian Conceptual Framework requirement that standard setters have to take
into account the economic consequences of their decisions is examined, particularly in
relation to the possibility that qualitative criteria like representational faithfulness might
have to be sacrificed in doing so. The claim that the need for such a sacrifice does not
arise because representational faithfulness is a notion which cannot be usefully applied to
the evaluation of accounting information is analysed and found wanting. Problems
associated with requiring standard setters to consider economic consequences are shown
to be manageable only after the ethical implications of their task are identified and
assessed.
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The extent to which standard setters in accounting should be required to take into
account the economic consequences of their decisions remains a difficult and contentious
problem. In this paper it will be shown that one aspect of the problem arises in relation to
representational faithfulness, a desirable qualitative characteristic of financial information
identified explicitly in the American Conceptual Framework project and implicitly in the
Australian one. Financial information is representationally faithful to the extent that what
is conveyed by the information corresponds to the underlying transactions and events
which it purports to represent. Giving weight to economic consequences seems to imply
that sometimes standard setters must sacrifice, at least to some extent, the satisfying of
qualitative criteria like representational faithfulness. However, if it is acceptable to make
compromises in relation to representational faithfulness, it seems to follow that it is
acceptable to sometimes mislead the users of financial reports.
Attempts to avoid this unpalatable implication will be identified. It has been
argued that conceptual framework requirements notwithstanding, not only is it
unnecessary to sacrifice representational faithfulness, it is not even possible.
Representational faithfulness, it is suggested, is a notion which is not applicable to the
evaluation of accounting information, and so the question of having to make a sacrifice
does not arise. It will be shown that this argument is not persuasive. The apparent tension
between the need to provide truthful or representationally faithful reports on the one
hand, and the need to consider economic consequences on the other cannot be avoided in
this way.
The Australian Conceptual Framework Statements will be closely examined to
determine how the requirement to consider economic consequences is characterised in
those Statements, and to clearly identify the difficulties that this requirement presents to
standard setters. Reasons will be given for believing that the problem is fundamentally an
ethical one, and that only by considering the ethical implications of the task does it
become more manageable. An obligation to a particular group of users of financial
information will be identified which obviates any need for standard setters to sacrifice
representational faithfulness in the pursuit of preferred economic consequences.
THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF STANDARD SETTING
By influencing the nature of the financial information that is provided by
reporting entities, and hence the decisions which are based on that information,
accounting standards do have economic consequences. There would be no point to
standard setting otherwise, and standards would not generate the interest that they do
unless they had an economic impact. Financial reports, and hence the standards upon
which they are based, contribute to the efficiency of resource allocation and to the
distribution of wealth within an economy. Apart from imposing direct information
preparation costs on reporting entities, a new standard will have economic consequences
through the behavioural changes that any altered flow of financial information induces.
Rappaport (1977, p.89) conveniently classifies the behavioural impact of
accounting standards as follows. Information prepared in accordance with standards
affects the behaviour of the intended recipients of financial reports such as shareholders
and other investors, whose decisions, for example, influence security prices and therefore
affect the wealth of market participants. The information also affects the behaviour of
"free riders" such as unions, competitors, suppliers and customers for whom reports are
not primarily intended but who nevertheless have access to them. Finally, standards affect
the behaviour of the managers of reporting entities. For example, they may alter their
investment strategies in anticipation of an adverse reaction to information that will have
to be supplied to comply with a new standard.
A number of writers have strongly advocated that standard setters should consider
economic consequences in their decision-making: 'without a knowledge of
consequences...it is inconceivable that a policy-making body...will be able to select
optimal financial accounting standards (Beaver 1973, p.56)'. In some cases the demand
for consideration of consequences is far-reaching. Hawkins (1975, p.17) argues that since
standard setters have the power to influence economic behaviour, they have an obligation
to support governments' economic plans. May and Sundem (1976, p.750) claim that 'if
the social welfare impact of accounting policy decisions were ignored, the basis for the
existence of a regulatory body would disappear'.
It is made clear in the Australian Conceptual Framework Statements that It IS
appropriate for standard setters to take into account economic consequences or, as they
are referred to in those Statements, "costs versus benefits". According to SAC 3, the
assessment of consequences by standard setters is intended to be extensive: 'in the process
of setting standards, standard setters seek to consider all costs and benefits in relation to
financial reporting generally, and not just as they pertain to individual reporting entities
(paragraph 45, emphasis added)'.
Importantly, the consideration of economic consequences by standard setters is
characterised as a constraint to the achievement of the various desirable qualitative
characteristics of financial information, implying that consequences may sometimes
preclude standard setters from achieving the best possible realisation of these
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characteristics. For the purposes of this paper, the most important of the qualitative
characteristics identified in SAC 3 is reliability:
The reliability of financial information will be determined by the de~ree of
correspondence between what that information conveys to users and the
underlying transactions and events that have occurred and been measured
and displayed. Reliable information will, without bias or undue error,
faithfully represent those transactions and events (paragraph 16, emphasis
added).
The fact that the anticipated economic consequences of a proposed standard are
presented as constraining the achievement of desirable qualitative characteristics seems to
imply that it may be appropriate in some situations to produce information that is not
representationally faithful so as to achieve a preferred outcome. Might consequentialist
arguments, for example, for keeping certain obligations off the balance sheet, have
prevailed had the likely impact on investment behaviour been considered sufficiently
undesirable? In certain circumstances, requiring standard setters to consider economic
consequences seems to justify a failure to provide faithful representations of financial
position.l
TRUTH AND REPRESENTATIONAL FAITHFULNESS
If it could be shown that conceptual framework requirements notwithstanding,
representational faithfulness is not a notion that can be usefully applied to the evaluation
of accounting information, then there would not be a problem of having to sacrifice
representational faithfulness in the pursuit of preferred economic consequences. This
strategy has been used, and relies on identifying a close conceptual link between
representational faithfulness and truth. The term "truth" does not appear in the above
extract from SAC 3. However, the use of the terms "correspondence" and "faithful
representations" in that extract do nevertheless capture an important aspect of what we
normally understand by the term "truth". Russell (1967, p.70) states that the view most
commonly held is that 'truth consists in some form of correspondence between belief and
fact'. Devitt (1984, p.26) states that 'the basic idea of a correspondence notion of truth is
familiar: a sentence is true if and only if it corresponds to the facts (or to reality)'. For the
purposes of this paper, it will therefore be accepted that the concepts of representational
faithfulness and truth are equivalent.Z
Why use the technical term "representational faithfulness" in the conceptual
framework projects if it has essentially the same import as the more familiar term "truth"?
Avoiding the term "truth" may have reflected an unwillingness to re-open the issue of
whether truth is a notion that is too vague and subjective to have operational usefulness in
the context of accounting. Yet it is that very belief, that truth (or its equivalent,
representational faithfulness) has no part to play in the evaluation of accounting
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information, which has been used to justify standard setters giving priority to economic
consequences in their deliberations.
Consider these claims. Gerboth (1972, p.48) is critical of 'the naive notion that
accounting is a search for a unique truth'. Buckley (1976, p.16) states that 'a blind groping
for truth when none exists, continues to hamper the policy-making efforts in accounting'.
In a currently popular Australian textbook, the view of accounting as a 'faithful
representation of some underlying "true" ...economic reality' is denied (Whittred and
Zimmer, 1988, p.84). Rappaport (1977, p.92) refers to 'the anachronistic view that
accounting is a field dedicated to the search for "true" income and "true" wealth, and (that)
once discovered, the truth will become compellingly apparent to all but the unenlightened'.
Not all of these comments are made in the context of the debate about economic
consequences but the implication is clear. If considered persuasive, such arguments
would strongly support standard setters giving priority to economic consequences
because questions of sacrificing truth or representational faithfulness would not arise.
This is the stance taken by Rappaport. After denying the possibility of discovering truth
in an accounting context, he argues that 'a responsible position of accountability calls for
the explicit consideration of the economic impact of financial accounting standards by all
accounting policymaking bodies' (Rappaport, 1977, p.98)'.
It is in this context that arguments purporting to show that truth is a notion which
is irrelevant to accounting will now be examined. The aim is to demonstrate that the
arguments are not persuasive, and that truth or representational faithfulness cannot be
dismissed, at least on the basis of these arguments, as having no significance to the debate
about economic consequences and standard setting. Three threads to the argument will be
identified. When isolated and examined individually, they will be shown to lose much of
their force.
ARGUMENTS AGAINST USING THE CRITERION OF TRUTH IN ACCOUNTING
Accounting representations lack empirical referents
It has been argued that accounting notions like "financial position" and "income"
have no empirical referents and that therefore the issue of a faithful correspondence
between measurements of "financial position" and "income" and some aspects of reality
just does not arise. Typically, arguments along these lines make comparisons with other
measurement processes which are accepted as successful. For example, Gerboth (1987,
p.97) states that '...measurement in accounting is not measurement in the usual sense of
the word. It is not application of measurement techniques to something that exists apart
from those techniques. We do not walk up to income and slap a yardstick against it.'
Puxty (1983, p.2S) does not deny that there is some mapping between accounts
and actual events. He gives as examples the sales figure for a period and the cash account
balance which he refers to as "real" measures. However. he says that no mapping occurs
4
with profit because it is not a physically existing quantity to be measured but rather a
"mental construct" in the mind of an observer. Similarly, Ingram and Rayburn (1989, 58)
deny that accounting reports are maps of reality. They too concede that accounting is
concerned to some extent with an objective reality, but the reality is limited to the
economic transactions of an enterprise such as the buying and selling of assets, and
transfers of cash and obligations.
What can be said in response to these claims? The emphasis on physical
measurement processes such as Gerboth's point about not being able to 'walk up to
income', and the reference by Puxty to 'physically existing quantities', cloud the issue.
Such points rest on an inappropriately narrow conception of what constitutes successful
measurement of phenomena, and wrongly give the impression that the object of any
measurement must be, in some sense, tangible and directly observable by the measurer.
Many measurement processes require a minimum of physical involvement and involve no
direct observation of the property being measured. They may rely on simply taking
readings from some appropriately calibrated instrument; for example, the reading of
radioactivity levels from a Geiger counter. In relation to accounting, as Chambers (1991,
p.8l) concedes, there is no physical yardstick, but that is not to say that accounting
representations have no empirical referents. As Wolnizer (1987, p.89) argues, 'the
financial features of firms ... cannot be observed directly; they are the consequence of
action. For example, the solvency, gearing and profitability of firms cannot be examined
or observed as directly sensable properties. They are, however, actual features of firms.'
The belief that there can be no referents for properties like income or financial
position probably also rests partly on a failure to recognise that they are derived from
aggregations of singular data, and as Wolnizer (1987, p.14) points out, it is the singular
data that actually have the corresponding referents in the "real world". We might agree
then with the view of Puxty (expressed above) that only an item like a cash account
balance at a particular time represents a "real" measure because it does have an empirical
referent, but it will be the aggregation of this measure, for example, with measures of
other assets and liabilities, similarly corresponding to appropriate referents, that will
enable us to say that a measure of financial position has an empirical basis.
On the other hand, one must also concede what is obviously correct in the claim
being examined. To the extent that representations of income or financial position,
prepared at present in accordance with the rules and procedures of conventional
accounting, rely on the expectations, intentions and opinions of managers, it is true that
they are not empirically based. In relation to depreciable assets, for example, there are no
empirical referents for values based partly on estimates of expected useful life and
disposal value. As Wolnizer (1987, p.3) states, 'extant accounting rules render the
financial representations of many assets, particularly non-cash assets, incapable of being
empirically or independently tested'.
This is not the place to consider how conventional accounting practices might be
changed. The important point is that in principle, representations of individual assets and
liabilities, for example, and therefore aggregated financial properties such as financial
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position, may be provided which correspond to appropriate empirical referents. That end
is achievable by having independently verifiable, faithful representations of dated
financial facts or events.
Accounting representations are partial
It has been argued that the information contained in financial reports cannot be
representationally faithful because inevitably that information is only a partial and limited
representation of reality, and so will distort reality to some extent. An example of this line
of argument is provided by Prakesh and Rappaport (1976, p.12). 'Though one may plead
for "economic reality" in accounting, every accounting description is nonetheless a
description of some facet of economic reality (emphasis added).' Similarly, Morgan
(1988, p.480) claims that: '...whatever perspective we choose to adopt, others are
squeezed from view...our knowledge always falls short in representing the full texture of
reality'. Kelly-Newton (1980, p.20) argues that 'the elusive truth of economic reality has
been pursued, with little recognition given to the fact that various measurements of the
same phenomenon communicate information regarding some aspects of the firm's
operation (emphasis added)'.
Ingram and Rayburn (1989, p.58) use a map analogy to support this argument.
They claim that accuracy in map-making is not an absolute quality since all maps, like
any abstraction from reality, including accounting reports, must inherently distort that
reality. It is important to note that this argument, at least as it is expressed by Morgan,
and Ingram and Rayburn, represents a quite radical position in that it applies to all
representations of reality, not just to those made in accounting.
One has to concede what is obviously correct in this claim. Any representation of
reality, accounting or otherwise, does involve some abstraction from reality and so
requires the selection of some aspects of reality for representation and not others.
However, is this really the same as saying, for example, in the case of accounting, that
any accounting representation of reality can only be distorted, incomplete and therefore
not true or faithful?
The critics appear to be using a criterion to judge the ability to achieve
representational faithfulness that is logically impossible to meet. If one succeeded, for
example, in conveying information about all the aspects of a firm's reality -- what
Sterling (1979, p.83) refers to as "full concreteness" -- then there would be no distortion,
but it would no longer be a representation of reality anyway but rather a duplication of it.
Following Carr (1988, p.87), there is a difference between expressing all the truth and
expressing only the truth.
The important point is not that representations inevitably fail to capture all aspects
of reality but rather that selected aspects of reality should be faithfully represented; that
is, with a close correspondence between the particular aspects of reality being represented
and the representation of them. The map analogy is again useful. Solomons (1986, p.93)
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claims that a three-dimensional map is more representationally faithful than a two-
dimensional one, because it more closely resembles that which it is representing. Now it
might be conceded that because the three-dimensional map is less abstract, it is less of a
distortion of reality. It necessarily encompasses more facets of reality. However, it is also
reasonable to insist that while three-dimensional maps may be more realistic than two-
dimensional ones, any map can misrepresent reality in an unacceptable way; for example,
if a three-dimensional map depicts a mountain that does not actually exist, or if the lines
representing roads on a two-dimensional map do not have the same relationship to each
other as the roads themselves. In this regard, a two-dimensional map can be just as
acceptable as a faithful representation of reality as a three-dimensional one.
Consider again the example of asset valuation. The problem is not to decide
which one of the various options such as historic cost, replacement cost, or realisable
value represents economic reality. Each of them can be thought of as representing an
aspect of economic reality. Nor should we concede, as the writers quoted above seem to
imply, that selection of one of these aspects will necessarily only present a partial,
distorted view of reality. A preferable alternative is to accept that the representation of a
selected aspect of reality will be unacceptable if it is not faithful; for example, if
replacement cost figures are measured and presented in a dated report, and they do not
correspond to the amounts that would have to be outlaid at that time to replace the assets
involved.
Two qualifying points are necessary. First, in taking the position presented above,
one does not mean to imply that representations have to be absolutely faithful to be
acceptable. Measurement processes often involve degrees of imprecision which are
unavoidable and must be tolerated. Second, whether a representation is acceptable or not
will depend not only on the accuracy of the representation but also on the use to which it
is to be put. With faithful representations of different aspects of reality possible, questions
still arise about which aspects of reality are relevant to the users of financial reports, and
should therefore be represented. As is made clear in SAC 3 (paragraph 19), these are
issues of effective, rather than faithful, representation.
Importantly, as Chambers and Wolnizer (1990) make clear, discussion about the
meaning of "truth", and whether it can be applied to the evaluation of accounting
information, is usually conducted in the absence of any agreement about which aspects of
financial reality should be truthfully represented. There is little agreement about what
constitutes the "financial position" of an entity at a particular time, for example, so it is
not surprising that uncertainty exists about how to obtain a representationally faithful
measurement of that property. No doubt, this uncertainty has contributed to the belief
held by some people that it is not fJ!ll. possible to provide a true or faithful representation
of a property like financial position.
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Accounting representations are subjective
It has been argued that information in financial reports cannot be true or
representationally faithful because the process of obtaining the information is inherently
subjective; that is, that the information presented is as dependent in important ways on
the observer/accountant as it is on what there is to be observed. It is influenced, for
example, by how the accountant chooses to categorise and measure the properties or
events that are observed: 'unfortunately, truth from an accounting perspective is not an
empirical fact to be discovered; it is a subjective understanding to be manufactured and
agreed upon (Ingram and Rayburn 1989, p.59)'.
Some writers, in emphasising the subjectivity that they believe is inherent in
accounting, actually make a point that applies to all empirical claims to knowledge. For
example, Morgan (1988, pA77), in denying that accountants are objective appraisers of
reality, says that 'all knowledge is a matter of perspective'. Similarly, Devine (1985, pAO)
claims that 'facts are interpretations relevant to a viewpoint', and Hines (1987, p.33)
argues that 'it has been shown that truth is not independent of time, place and viewpoint -
there are many possible truths.' The subjectivity identified by these writers is said to exist
at the level of the individual observer, depending upon his or her expectations, biases, and
cognitive processes. Differences between how the world is apprehended may also derive
from wider cultural factors: '...it (accounting) does not reflect fundamental or absolute
truth, but rather reflects the mores, values and ideology of a particular society, at a
particular time (Hines, 1987, p.3l)'.
One has to concede that any attempt to acquire knowledge about the world will
involve the participation of an observer who will inevitably take a particular perspective
and choose certain concepts to order and arrange the observations which are made. It is
impossible to discover the truth or falsity of a proposition by making direct comparisons
between our representations of that reality and a mind-independent, unconceptualised
reality. In other words, we cannot compare our representations with reality as it is in
itself, independent of our apprehension of it. There is no absolute truth or representational
faithfulness in that sense. It is also a fact that our attempts to represent some aspect of
reality may be affected by preconceptions and biases, cultural or otherwise. This is
consistent with Lukka (1990, p.246) who says in relation to accounting, '...accountings
and calculations cannot have a simple one-way relation with the underlying things,
whatever they are (emphasis added)'.
However, there are also a number of points to be made in response to this
argument. Just because subjective factors influence the observation process, it does not
mean that all observation statements are completely arbitrary. If observation is an
interactive process, involving an observer and an independent reality, then reality
constrains the possible knowledge claims that can be made. In relation to accounting in
particular, subjectivity does not entail, for example, that any claim about the wealth or
income of a reporting entity at a particular time is as valid as any other. Hines seems to
acknowledge this point. She was quoted above as denying only the possibility of
"absolute" truth in accounting. This is consistent with the claim she made in a subsequent
article: 'there is no such thing as the truth, but there is such a thing as stretching the truth
too far' (Hines, 1988, p.2S3). This seems to imply that even if the subjective nature of
observation meant that we can never claim absolute truth or representational faithfulness
of an observation claim, we can at least sometimes know when a claim is false or
representationally unfaithful.
This point can be related to the one made in the previous section about
measurement imprecision. One factor which leads to variations in measurements is
subjective differences between observers. There will necessarily be degrees of accuracy
in accounting representations just as there are in any measurement activity. The process
of assigning a figure to the wealth of a business, for example, obviously will involve
some imprecision and many assumptions about which aspects of the business contribute
to that wealth. However, that does not mean that representations of the wealth of a
business which fall outside a certain range cannot be rejected. Presumably, this is what
Solomons (1978, p.72) had in mind when he commented that '...whatever limitations
representational accuracy may have in pointing us toward right accounting answers, it
will at least sometimes enable us to detect a wrong answer'.
Similar doubts arise in relation to Hines' point about how accounting is dependent
on cultural factors. This is best illustrated by the example that she uses of an Indian
carpenter who is prepared to produce a number of chairs but insists on charging a greater
price for each additional chair to compensate for his boredom (Hines 1987, p.31).
Admittedly Hines only presents this as a whimsical example, but there is a point to be
drawn from it. Suppose that this did represent a genuine cultural difference. We would
probably not expect, as Hines claims, to find a monetary value placed on boredom in an
industrial society. However, the point is that the cultural difference, as presented by
Hines, is identifiable as such, and is not an obstacle to an accurate representation of the
facts. We are still able to determine, for example, the price of the chairs, irrespective of
the cultural factors that determined that price. This supports the more general point made
by White (1983, p.lO) that to be able to appreciate that another culture has certain values
and beliefs that differ from our own also presupposes that we inhabit a common world
with shared referents and properties. We could not begin to understand the beliefs of the
other culture otherwise.
The preceding discussion has cast serious doubts on the various arguments that
purport to show that truth or representational faithfulness in accounting reports is in
principle unachievable. The general contention that no empirical claims to knowledge can
be held to be true is not persuasive. There are useful and practical distinctions made
everyday between true and false statements. The critics quoted above have not provided
reasons why accounting information cannot be objective and true in the sense that those
terms are used in everyday language. Similarly, the terms "wealth" and "income" appear
to be used successfully to represent certain aspects of reality in everyday language, and it
seems reasonable to view their specialised use in accounting merely as an extension of
that everyday use. This is not to say, as has been pointed out, that all accounting reports
are at present true or representationally faithful. Rather, no reason has been given for
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believing that the objective of truth in accounting, as that term is commonly understood,
is impossible to achieve.
The arguments do show that we cannot make claims to absolute truth or absoLute
representational faithfulness. However, to borrow a distinction used by White (1983,
p.134), this demonstrates something about true propositions, rather than persuading us to
deny their existence altogether. It is clear that many of the writers whose views have been
examined realise that their conclusions are restricted in this way. But if that is the case,
they must acknowledge that decisions about truth and falsity can still be legitimately
made in this less than absolute sense. Propositions can be held to be true if they
correspond to reality as that reality is apprehended by us. As White (1983, p.135) makes
clear, establishing truth in this sense simply requires what we naturally accept to be
rational behaviour; 'looking to the evidence of (one's) senses, to the evidence of the past,
to the community's best established beliefs and theories, to its basic epistemic principles'.
It follows then that the tension between truth (or representational faithfulness) and
the need to consider the economic consequences of standard setting cannot be avoided
simply by denying the applicability of notions of truth (or representational faithfulness) to
accounting. Before progress can be made in resolving this tension, the way that the
Conceptual Framework Statements characterise the requirement to take into account
economic consequences needs to be examined again more closely.
CORRECTLY CHARACTERISING THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES ISSUE
To this point in the discussion it has been sufficient to characterise the standard
setting problem under consideration in a way that is consistent with how it is usually
presented in the literature; that is, if economic consequences have to be taken into
account in standard setting, then they may be inconsistent with, and will therefore have to
be balanced against, factors of a completely different kind -- against certain theoretically
or technically correct accounting criteria like representational faithfulness. Zeff (1978,
p.63), for example, talks of the need for a 'delicate balancing' by standard setters between
accounting considerations and the possible adverse economic and social consequences of
their actions. In the Business Council Bulletin (March 1990, p.27) concern was expressed
that standards, despite being theoretically desirable, might have undesirable economic
consequences. For example, they may adversely affect the international competitiveness
of complying firms: 'no matter how desirable a standard may be theoretically it should
not be adopted if it is likely to put Australia at an international competitive
disadvantage...(emphasis added)'.
However, close examination of Conceptual Framework Statements reveals a more
subtle characterisation of the issue. It is stated in SAC 2 (paragraph 26) that the
fundamental purpose of financial reporting, and hence the priority of standard setters, is
to facilitate the decision-making of users of financial reports: '...the objective of general
purpose financial reporting is to provide information to users that is useful for making
and evaluating decisions about the allocation of scarce resources'.
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Other components of the Conceptual Framework completed to date detail criteria
which it is assumed must be met to satisfy that objective. As already indicated, SAC 3
identifies attributes or qualitative characteristics such as reliability and relevance which
accounting information needs to possess if it is to serve that objective. SAC 4 establishes
definitions and recognition criteria for the elements of financial statements such as assets
and liabilities that are consistent with the achievement of the objective.
It might be felt that such issues are exactly what is meant by technical or
theoretical accounting considerations. However, the important point is that these criteria
are not assumed to have any inherent or intrinsic value of their own. They are specified as
worthwhile only to the extent that they contribute to the objective of general purpose
reporting identified in SAC 2, and it is made quite clear in SAC 2 that this objective is
worth pursuing because of the desirable economic consequences which will flow from its
achievement; that is, that it will lead to a more efficient allocation of scarce resources:
'efficient allocation of scarce resources will be enhanced if those who make resource
allocation decisions...have the appropriate financial information on which to base their
decisions. General purpose financial reporting aims to provide this information
(paragraph 13)'.
It is true that one other objective is identified in SAC 2: 'general purpose financial
reporting also provides a mechanism to enable managers and governing bodies to
discharge their accountability (paragraph 14)'. However, that goal too is later subsumed
under the broader one of resource allocation efficiency on the grounds that users who are
provided with information by accountable managers and governing bodies 'ultimately
require the information for resource allocation decisions (paragraph 27)'.
As characterised in the Conceptual Framework Statements then, it follows that
ultimately the choices which must be made by standard setters are between factors of the
same type, that is between conflicting economic consequences, rather than between
factors of different types, that is, technical or theoretical accounting factors on the one
hand, and economic consequences on the other. The identified technical or theoretical
accounting criteria are assumed to produce a desirable economic outcome, an efficient
allocation of resources, and if anticipated economic consequences of a proposed standard
other than ones related to that outcome are to justify relaxation of some of the accounting
criteria then ultimately it must be because some sacrifice in efficiency of resource
allocation is considered acceptable.
The point can be illustrated by using the example of lease capitalisation.
Presumably, one of the factors at least implicitly considered by standard setters when this
matter was dealt with was that by requiring the recognition of lease agreements
previously ignored, financial statements would represent more faithfully the financial
position of complying firms. Reports would therefore be more reliable according to the
meaning of that qualitative characteristic as subsequently explained in SAC 3. On the
other hand, standard setters may well have been under some pressure not to introduce
such a standard because of the resultant costs that would have to be borne by some
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parties. Complying firms, for example, may have expected to be perceived as riskier than
before, and would therefore have expected to find it more difficult and costly to attract
funds. In keeping with SAC 3, this is an economic consequence of legitimate concern to
standard setters. Possible loss or diminution of competitive position is one of the costs
which they need to consider (paragraph 42). However, it should not have been a matter of
judging whether a theoretical or technical factor like representational faithfulness needed
to be sacrificed to save some parties from unreasonable costs. Rather, it should have been
a question of judging whether one economic consequence, the efficient allocation of
resources that is supposed to follow from having financial information with
characteristics like representational faithfulness, could be sacrificed to some extent to
avoid financial hardship to particular parties, another economic consequence.
In one sense, the way that the issue is characterised in the Conceptual Framework
is reassuring. It seems intuitively obvious that it is a simpler task to balance factors of the
same type against each other rather than factors that are different in kind. However, the
task is actually far from simple. The fact that standard setters apparently have to quantify
the various potential economic consequences of their decisions creates immense
measurement problems. It will be difficult enough to determine the possible impact of a
proposed standard on individuals or groups. As SAC 3 (paragraphs 44 and 45) makes
clear, information about the expected impact of a standard will need to be gathered from
the various affected parties, and their assessments of the likely economic consequences
will probably differ. The measurement difficulties are exaggerated because the economic
consequences of a proposed standard will depend on the reaction of users of reports, so
. the process of assessing consequences will involve some double-guessing about
responses. The reactions of the preparers of financial reports will have to be anticipated,
for example, as they in tum attempt to anticipate the reactions of report users.
Assessing the impact of a potential standard on the efficiency of resource
allocation is even more problematical. There may be intuitive appeal in the assumption
that reliable and relevant financial information, for example, will contribute positively to
an efficient allocation of resources. However, even if one accepts this assumption, it is
doubtful whether anyone has sufficient understanding of the processes involved to
achieve what seems to be expected of standard setters; that is, that they need to quantify
the impact on resource allocation efficiency in cases where some sacrifice in the
reliability or relevance of financial reports is needed to accommodate other economic
consequences.
Importantly, apart from the measurement problem involved in assessing economic
consequences, the Conceptual Framework Statements do not provide criteria by which
conflicting economic consequences are to be balanced against each other. It seems then
that standard setters are faced with insurmountable problems in incorporating economic
consequences into their decision-making in a way consistent with the characterisation of
the issue in the Conceptual Framework Statements. In the next section, the possibility of
resolving this dilemma by explicitly recognising the ethical factors inherent in the
standard setting task will be considered.
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THE ETHICS OF STANDARD SETTING
The responsibilities of standard setters can be thought of, at least in part, as being
ethical. It is quite proper to assess whether standard setters have made the right or wrong
decision in a particular case. To the extent that judgements of this type rest on the fact
that standard setters are agents whose decisions affect the interests of a variety of parties,
we can say that such judgements are ethical ones.
Different approaches can be taken to assessing a decision or action that has ethical
implications. Under a teleological (or consequentialist) approach, a decision or action will
be judged to be right if it contributes to the realisation of some intrinsically worthwhile
and ultimate good. The characterisation of the responsibilities of standard setters in the
Australian Conceptual Framework Statements, while not couched explicitly in ethical
terms, has features consistent with this approach. Financial reporting is referred to as a
means rather than an end (SAC 2, paragraph 11), and, as explained in the previous
section, it is made clear that ultimately the aim in presenting financial information is to
contribute to the goal of efficiency in resource allocation. Perhaps even that goal is best
thought of as an intermediate means to an end, and that implicit in the Conceptual
Framework Statements is the understanding that efficiency of resource allocation will
enhance some (admittedly vague and difficult to define) notion of general community
economic well-being.
An alternative to taking a consequentialist approach is to adopt a deontological
one. Broadly speaking, under this approach, a decision or action is judged to be right to
the extent that it is based on some intrinsically worthwhile rule or principle of action, or
some notion of duties or rights, for example, rather than on the ultimate consequences
which are expected to follow from the decision or action. Such an approach allows one,
for example, to consider the ethical implications of the special status held by some people
in their relationships with others:
... if all that mattered was consequences, then, in so far as these counted
morally, all similar cases would count alike, regardless of any special
relationships ... what deontology can do, while consequentialism cannot, is
to make decisions described in terms of any such special relations to (an)
agent obligatory or wrong as such (Mackie, 1977, p.158).
An associated point is that any consideration of how benefits are distributed
between people must necessarily be absent from a purely consequentialist approach.
There is a hint of a deontological consideration of this type in SAC 3, or at least a
concern that such considerations are being ignored, when it is acknowledged that there is
no guarantee that the costs involved in the provision of financial information will be
borne by those who reap the benefits (paragraph 43). The fact that standard setters are
required to consider not only ultimate resource allocation consequences but also, for
example, the impact of their decisions on the competitive positions of particular
interested groups also implies a deontological consideration.
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It is clear then that standard setting is a task with ethical implications and that
these implications need to be brought out into the open and clarified. In the previous
section it was shown that the responsibilities of standard setters are characterised in the
Conceptual Framework Statements in such a way as to avoid the need to balance
opposites, that is, "theoretical" considerations and economic consequences, against one
another. However, in doing so, a different tension between opposites arises, that is, in an
ethical sense, between consequentialist considerations and deontological ones.
Furthermore, in the previous section, it was shown that the "accountability" of managers
and governing bodies, clearly a deontological consideration, is subsumed under the
ultimate aim of resource allocation efficiency. This indicates an implicit bias in the
Conceptual Framework towards a consequentialist approach.
Is that bias appropriate? The question of whether a consequentialist or
deontological approach should be taken by standard setters needs to be addressed. While
reasons have been given above for thinking that deontological considerations are often
required, for example, where special relationships between parties exist and duties or
obligations arise, there is still the possibility that they should be taken into account in
conjunction with consequentialist ones. Mackie (1977) provides excellent reasons for
accepting that even if the achievement of some ultimate good is considered desirable,
there are sound practical reasons for taking a deontological approach to the assessment of
immediate decisions rather than a consequentialist one. His reasoning can be applied
directly to the standard setting situation, and provides some initial grounds for believing
that even with the ultimate aim of providing financial information which enhances the
efficiency of resource allocation and general economic prosperity, it is preferable for
standard setters not to make their decisions specifically in relation to those consequences.
Mackie's first point is that any attempt to determine the consequences of an action
is fraught with difficulties: '... any calculation of the consequences of an action beyond
the most immediate and obvious ones, even if it were possible, would be absurdly
wasteful of time and effort ... the question about all the differential consequences of this
or that alternative is almost always intractable. (1977, p.155)'. As was made clear in the
previous section, this is certainly true of the decisions that have to made by standard
setters.
Mackie also argues that if people operating in a social environment are to prosper
as a result of their choices and endeavours, there needs to be some degree of regularity
and reliability in the behaviour of other people with whom they interact: '... the majority
of human actions should be guided ... by habit ... rather than by the calculation of any
considerable range of consequences (1977, p.157)'. This point is relevant to standard
setting. It would be unsatisfactory for standard setters to base their decisions on the
calculation of ultimate consequences to any significant extent if the parties affected by
their decisions are unable, in the pursuit of their goals, to make assumptions about the
direction standard setters will take in the future. In other words, it would be unacceptable
for there to be a lack of consistency between individual standards other than them being
based on some general principle of pursuing preferred ultimate economic outcomes.
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Consistent with these views, in the remainder of this paper it will be argued that
standard setters ought to give priority in their decision-making to a deontological
consideration, that is, to an obligation which they have to tell the truth to a particular
class of users of financial information. They may anticipate that in meeting this
obligation, rational decision-making by the users and various associated economic
benefits will follow, but such considerations will not provide the justification for meeting
the obligation. Necessarily, the analysis will not be exhaustive and it will not be possible
to assess the interests of all groups affected by accounting standards. For the sake of
simplicity, only the conflicting interests of two groups, the preparers of financial reports
and the users for whom those reports are primarily prepared, will be taken into account.
Despite this limitation, an important conclusion will be reached in relation to whether
standard setters should consider sacrificing representational faithfulness in the pursuit of
preferred economic consequences.
Two associated points need to be considered first. One relates to the recognition
by a number of writers that since standard setting involves making choices between the
conflicting interests of different groups, then the process is necessarily a political one.
Gerboth (1973, p.479) makes the point in this way. 'When a decision-making process
depends for its success on public confidence, the critical issues are not technical; they are
political...In the face of conflict between competing interests, rationality as well as
prudence lies not in seeking final answers, but rather in compromise - essentially a
political process.'
One has to concede that there is a political aspect to standard setting. It might
even be possible for standard setters to employ a politically justified rationale that
happened to coincide with an ethical one. For example, it might be thought politically
expedient as well as ethically justifiable to give equal consideration to the interests of all
parties affected by the decisions of standard setters. However, it is likely that standard
setting boards will have to make compromises geared more to appeasing the most
powerful interest groups, and it will be contended in this paper that the interests of one
group, certainly not the most powerful one, merits the special attention of standard
setters. The purpose of the analysis in this paper is to identify an ethically correct
foundation for the decisions of standard setters rather than to examine the ways in which
their decisions may have to be amended as a matter of political necessity.
The second point relates to the question of neutrality, another qualitative
characteristic identified in SAC 3. It might be thought that the requirement that standard
setters satisfy this criterion offers sufficient protection for users of financial information
without complicating the issue with ethical considerations. There is considerable
confusion about the issue of neutrality. Some writers deny that neutrality can be achieved
in relation to standard setting. For example, Bromwich (1985, p.81) makes the following
claim. 'Generally, it can be said that accounting standards are not neutral. They will affect
variously different members of society.' While true, this is not the sense in which
neutrality is defined in SAC 3. In that Statement, neutrality implies that financial reports
should not be presented in a way that is designed to generate particular behaviour in the
users of the reports: '...financial reporting should, if it is to be reliable, be free from bias
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(that is, be neutral). It should not be designed to lead users to conclusions that serve
particular needs, desires or preconceptions of the preparers (paragraph 21)'. The reason
why this criterion does not offer sufficient protection to users is that neutrality, just like
representational faithfulness, is characterised in SAC 3 as subject to the constraint of
"costs verses benefits", that is, it is only a means to an end that apparently may be
sacrificed in attempting to achieve that end. For this reason, there is still a need to
explicitly identify the ethical responsibilities of standard setters.
A useful starting point for drawing out the obligations of standard setters is the
prima facie duty or obligation of fidelity identified originally by Ross (1930, p.21) and
applied to accounting by Ruland (1984, p.227). Ruland argues that the accounting
profession is obliged to present truthful or representationally faithful information to users
because it has made an implicit promise to do so. According to Ruland, the promise exists
generally as part of any information provider/receiver relationship. An examination of the
history of the profession, with its emphasis on stewardship and independent verification,
reinforces Ruland's belief that the obligation also exists specifically in the case of
accounting. It follows that any purposeful misrepresentation in accounting reports must
be wrong because it violates this obligations. Standard setters can be considered to fall
under the umbrella of the term "accounting profession". They are subject to the obligation
since they play a part in determining the nature of the accounting information which is
provided to users.
There are reasons for believing that the identified obligation to users is especially
strong in the case of one particular sub-group of users, that is, those users such as small
investors who depend on published reports for their information needs. Their position is a
vulnerable one, and they are entitled to financial reports that suitably meet their decision-
making requirements. To satisfy this entitlement, financial reports need to be
representationally faithful. The special status of this group of users has not gone
unnoticed: 'general purpose financial reporting focuses on providing information to meet
the common information needs of users who are unable to command the preparation of
reports tailored to their particular information needs (SAC 2, paragraph 7)'. Henderson
and Peirson (1988, p.IO), focusing in particular on small investors, argue that this group,
which has little bargaining power or influence, needs more help than large institutional
investors. 'Small investors are forced into a less diversified portfolio because of limited
resources with the result that they are in a more vulnerable position when compared to
institutional investors.'
How might the obligation to the identified group of users be balanced against the
interests of other groups affected by the decisions of standard setters? Consider the
competing interests of dependent users and the preparers of financial reports. It is likely
to be in the interest of preparers of financial reports to face a minimum of restrictions.
They will prefer to limit the amount and type of information that they are required to
provide, and will want to make a favourable impression on report users. On the other
hand, it will be in the interests of dependent users to have as much representationally
faithful information disclosed as possible, at least to the point where that information can
be usefully assimilated.
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Why should an obligation to dependent users take priority over the interests of the
preparers of reports? Why not accept that the groups are equally entitled to have their
interests taken into consideration, and that any burden associated with standard setting
should be shared between the affected groups? After all, the obligation to users of
accounting reports upon which the position taken in this paper rests was originally
presented only as a prima facie one. Some writers insist that the interests of the preparers
of reports have to be considered by standard setters as well. "Fairness to account users
must be counterbalanced by fairness to account producers" (Harris, 1987, p.86).
One may concede that the burden should be shared between the parties in relation
to how much representationally faithful information to provide; in other words, in relation
to how many aspects of financial reality are to be represented to users. Similarly, and
consistent with the denial of any absolute truth or representational faithfulness in a
previous section of this paper, one might also concede that preparers of reports do not
have to be relentless in the pursuit of precision in their measurements. Provision of
information is costly so it seems reasonable that standard setters should compromise in
this respect.
However, there are reasons for rejecting the possibility of compromise to the
extent that it implies that information which is not representationally faithful might have
to be presented, for example, to elicit some behavioural response from users that is
preferred by the preparers of reports. The crucial point is the permissibility of deceit that
is implied. Unless advised to the contrary, users of financial reports will be naturally
inclined to interpret the information contained in a report as a reasonably accurate
depiction of a firm's position and performance; that is, as representationally faithful. They
will not expect that the accuracy of the information has been compromised to
accommodate political pressures, for example, nor to elicit from them a certain desired
response. To the extent that representational faithfulness was ever sacrificed, users who
believe reports are representationally faithful would be deceived. Users who are
dependent on published reports would be most affected.
One might respond that this objection can be avoided by making it clear to users
exactly how and when representational faithfulness had been compromised. Solomons
(1978, p.71) acknowledges this possibility. 'It is perfectly proper for measurements to be
selected with particular political ends in mind or to be adapted to a particular end if it is
made clear to users of the measurement what is being done.' However, in an important
respect, such an admission would be self-defeating. In making it clear to users that
representational faithfulness had been sacrificed in a particular case, the attempt to
manipulate their reactions would become obvious, and the desired behaviour would be
unlikely to follow. There would be no point, for example, in making a decision not to
require lease capitalisation because an unwanted flow of resources between sectors of the
economy would follow, but at the same time disclose to investors that balance sheets did
not faithfully represent all the liabilities of affected firms. Users would obviously then
become suspicious about the riskiness of the firms involved anyway. They might attempt
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to adjust for the bias contained in the reports, but would presumably attach little
credibility to the reports as presented.
There is another way to view this issue. The claim that all affected parties such as
the preparers of reports are entitled to have their interests taken into account in deciding
on a standard, and not only dependent users, assumes that the position immediately prior
to implementing the standard was equitable. If, however, users were being misled prior to
the standard -- for example, because certain liabilities were being kept off the balance
sheet -- then the argument that the interests of preparers of reports were being neglected
in the standard setting process would lose its force.
This point raises again the political aspect of standard setting and the concern
expressed by some writers that the preparers of financial reports might come to dominate
the standard setting process. Preparers of reports certainly represent a more organised and
powerful force than users such as small investors who are dependent on published
reports. Dopuch and Sunder (1980, p.15) suggest that this power makes it unrealistic to
base standard setting on the primacy of the user because it does not reflect 'the economic
reality of the power of suppliers in the accounting market place...'. This view is supported
by Kelly-Newton (1980, p.l58) who insists that a 'myopic concentration on the user' is an
unsatisfactory basis for policy-setting. However, in response, it can be argued that the
interests of preparers of reports do not need to be accommodated by standard setters
because standard setting should ultimately constrain the exercise of their power and
regulate their behaviour. As Miller (1985, p.30) argues, the right of preparers to influence
standard setters should be forfeited:
In the context of standards setting, the simple fact is that the purpose of the
process is to constrain the behaviour of statement preparers. Simply put,
the process is designed to protect users against the perfectly normal
tendency of preparers to make accounting policy decisions that allow them
to look as good as possible.
It might be argued that the identified obligation to dependent users does not need
to be met because in the absence of standards, firms that did not provide information that
was representationally faithful would eventually be identified and shunned. However,
ensuring that reports are representationally faithful is justifiable in the same sense that
consumer protection legislation is justifiable. Consumers may eventually identify
suppliers of unsatisfactory goods or services but many would be unfairly disadvantaged
in the process, and legislation is designed to avoid that harm occurring. Similarly,
standards should be designed to ensure that dependent users are not unfairly misled by
reports that are not representationally faithful. This is what Beaver (1973, p.52) means
when he says that the role of reports is essentially 'pre-emptive', that is, to prevent people
who are not dependent users achieving abnormal returns by trading on inside information.
Presumably, it is also what Solomons (1983, p.107) means when he refers to the need to
prevent short-run damage to investors.
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CONCLUSION
The task faced by standard setters is an extraordinarily difficult one, especially in
relation to the requirement to consider the economic consequences of their decisions. In
this paper it has been argued that ethical considerations have a useful role to play in the
standard setting process. An obligation of standard setters to ensure that
representationally faithful information is provided to users, particularly dependent ones,
has been identified, while the need to balance that obligation against any anticipated
economic consequences has been shown to be unjustified.
No doubt, many people would take for granted that the primary responsibility of
standard setters is to the users of financial reports, particularly those who cannot
command access to the information that they need, and so would not find the position
developed in this paper surprising or controversial. However, the crucial point is that the
Australian Conceptual Framework Statements do not explicitly recognise this priority, do
not acknowledge the ethical nature of the standard setting task, and unnecessarily
complicate that task by requiring standard setters to consider all the economic
consequences of their decisions.
FOOTNOTES
1. The case of accounting for oil and gas exploration costs in the U.S.A. is pertinent, and illustrates that the
issue under consideration is not just a hypothetical one. SFAS 19 made the successful efforts method of
accounting for those costs mandatory and proscribed the full cost method largely because the latter was
thought to obscure failure and relative risk. In other words, the successful efforts method more faithfully
represented performance and financial position. However, in response to political pressure and a persuasive
economic consequences argument, that standard was latter rescinded and both methods permitted. It was
claimed that SFAS 19 was contrary to national economic policy in that it would suppress competition and
would lead to less exploration and development of reserves. For more information on this case, see Wolk ~
gL(I984, pp. 455-475).
2. In making this simplifying assumption, less intuitively appealing alternatives to the correspondence
theory of truth, such as the coherence view, are being disregarded. Associated questions such as whether,
under a correspondence view of truth, "truth"~ a correspondence between propositions and facts, or
whether a correspondence with facts should only be thought of as a criterion for deciding whether a
proposition is true. are also being ignored. Questions about truth that arise in relation to analytical
propositions such as those of mathematics or those which are true simply because of the meaning of words.
are not relevant to this paper. The concern is restricted to truth as it applies to empirical claims to
knowledge.
3. Ruland ultimately reaches a similar conclusion to the one reached in this paper but the route by which he
reaches his conclusion is different. Rather than accepting practical reasons for rejecting a consequentialist
approach. he attempts to weigh the consequentialist and deontological considerations involved in standard
setting against one another. For example. he prefers to acknowledge that standard setters have some
responsibility to produce good economic consequences but that this responsibility is weaker than the
identified obligation to users of reports. It is only a negative responsibility in the sense that any
consequences will not flow directly from the actions of the standard setters themselves but from the actions
of others such as the users and preparers of reports.
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